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BREACH OF THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE, SECTION 301,
AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Paul R. Baier

A

declared purpose of our national labor legislation i s to promote an

industrial environment in which the peace of the bargaining session

supplants

the warfare o f a strike or lockout .

The "structural and institu

tional invention of the Wagner Act" seated labor and management at the

bargaining t able, but "the content of the bargain . .
was to be worked
out between the representatives of the two constituencies. . . . 111 Today,
•

the bargain's cont ent often includes a union's p.romise not to strike

during the t erm of the agreement in exchange for management's promise
to arbitr ate grievance d isputes. 2 Understandably, Congress has attempted

to promote this voluntary exchange, for the no-strike clause and the

arbitral process provide a peaceful alternative to self-help.

Section 30l(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act3 authorizes
federal d istrict courts to entertain "suits for violation of contracts be

tween an employer and a labor organization.
reflects

.

. ."

The provision

Congress' interest in the effective enforcement of both labor and

management's contract responsibilities.

By establishing a

forum in which

to redress the breach of the bargaining agreement, particularly breach of
the no-strike clause, Congress sought to assure an e m ployer freedom

from ec onomic warfare,

tion during the term of

<Jn

employer would sign
In Textile Workers

l

for without the guarantee of uninterrupted produc

the contract,

"there is little reason why an
114

such a contract.

5
v. Lin coln Mills

the Supreme Court construed

Chayes,

The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law i n The Corporation
in M.:>dern Society, 25 , 42 (E.S. Mason ed. 1966).
2

One study estimates that agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes can

be fou nd in 94% of all collective bargaining c ontracts.

Bok,

3

Cases on Labor Law 516

(6th ed.

A.

C ox & D.

1965).

29 U.S. C. se c. 185 (a) (1964).
"Suits for violation of contracts between
an e mp loyer and a labor organization
may be brought in any district
court of

.

.

•

the United States having Jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in c ontroversy or withou t regard to the citizenship

of the partie s. "
4

S. Rep.

5 3 u .s.
35

No.

105,

80th

448 (1957).

Cong., 1st Sess.

224

16 (1947).

Section 301 ·as a congressional mandate to the federal judiciary to fashion
a body of substantive law governing the breach o f bargaining agreements.

Section 301 was more than jurisdictional; it possessed a substantive
independence of its own.

the Court has

law which,

In giving effect to that substantive independence,

in a series of pronouncements developed a body of labor

in the main, facilitates the voluntary surrender of s elf-help.

In Charles Dowd Box Co. v.

Courtney,

6

the Court reaffirmed the

earlier Lincoln Mills dictum that state courts were to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over suits arising out of breach of the collective bargaining
Reviewing the legislative history of Section 301, the Court
agreemen t.

. . is that the
noted that "the clear implication of the entire record
purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district co urts was not
•

but to supplement,

to displace,

the thoroughly considered jurisdiction

of the courts of the various states over contrac ts made by labor organi
7
However, the rights arising under the bargaining agreement
zations."
are federal rights.

One body of substantive law,

federal law,

the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,

brought in state or federal courts.

8

governs

whether s u it is

State law does not exist as an in
9

dependent sou r c e of the rights of either an employer or his union.

One case presents a complicating exception--Sinclair Ref. Co. v .
Atk inson.10
S inclair was a suit bro ught in a federal court by an employer
seeking injunct ive relief against a strike by a union ·over an allegedly
arbitrable grievance,

in violation of a no-strik e agreement .

Squarely

fac ing the issue of the effect of the anti-injunction provisions of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the jurisdiction of federal courts under Section
301, the Court

6

368 u .s.

held that federal courts were barred from issuing an

Concluding that an order enjoining the strike would c o ntravene

injunction.

502

(1962).

7

Id. at 511.
A t the time of the en actment of
sec. 301, union s, as unincorporated associations, were not subje
ct to suit in a numb er of
sta tes beca use of local procedural diffi
culties.
Sec tion 301 was design ed
to eliminate such diff iculties by providing
a feder al forum free from local
procedural r estrain t.
8
9

Local 174, Tea msters v. Luc as Flou
r Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
Textile Wo rkers v. Li ncoln Mil
ls,

l0370 U.S.

353 U.S.

195 (1962).

225

448

(1957).

the proscription of injunct ions against strikes contained i n Section 4 (a)

11

of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court affirmed the district court's dis
12
of the prayer for injunctive relief.
"for lack of jurisdiction11

missal

Whether Section 4 is applicable in a sui t brought in a state court for
violation

of a contract made by a labor organization, and whether there

f

exist impe iment
to the free removal to a federal court o f such a suit
3
.
remain
at issue.

?

"Jurisdiction" is a peculiarly elusive concept.

S inclair omits any

discussion of the meaning of jurisdiction; from this very silence,
Sinclair derives its importance.
all,

As the condition precedent

however,

to acting at

jurisdiction attaches to state and federal courts alike in Section

suits.

After taking cognizance of the suit,

301

a court's jurisdiction involves

the power to consider the merits and render a binding decision.

In this

sense jurisdiction means application of rules of law to give effect to
the substantive rights o f the parties.
diction in

A state court's exercise of juris

this sense is limited to the extent that the applicable rules of

law are those fashioned by the federal judiciary.

Assuming for the

moment that rights arising under the bargaining agreement and remedies
available

effectuating those rights are not coterminous,

issuance of an

order restraining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause is an exercise
of jurisdiction in still another sense.

An employer seeking injunctive
"bundle of
sound principles of decision concerning particu lar kinds of relief. 11 14

relief must invoke the exercise of equity jurisdiction--that

Jurisdiction here consists of authority to redress irreparable harm with
specific relief.

Rather than a power to act in the first instance--a power

to take cognizance of the suit--equity jurisdiction involves the subsequent

determinati o n whether the case merits a peculiar kind of relief.
The conceptual difficulty immediately confronts a district court upon
11
29 U.S . c.

sec. 1 0 4

(1964).

"No court of the United S tate s shall have

iurisdiction to issue any restraining order or .

•

. injunction"

labor dispu te to "prohibit any person or persons . . . fro m
"
ceasin g or refusing to perfonn any work.

12

370 U.S.

187
In

at 215.

•

in a
•

. (a)

Neither the Supreme Court n or the district court,

F . Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 19 60), discussed the meaning of jurisdiction.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U . S . 238 (1962), the Court sustained

the district court's refusal to dismiss the accompanying claim for damages.
13

The issues were noted i n Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at
th e Court expressly refrained from intimating any view.

14

z. Chafee, Some Problems of Egu�304 (1950).

226

491 n. 8 , but

defendant union's petition for removal of an action brou� ht initial y i� a
.
state court by an employer seeking injunctive r 1ef
aga�nst a strike m
breach of a no-strike c lause.
The Removal Act
establishes two pre
requisites:
the district court must possess original jurisdiction of the
action, and the claim or right asserted must arise under the laws of the
United States.

11

�

16
the
Mach inists ,
In such a suit, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735,
ary
mpor
�
t
a
d
had issue
union petitioned for removal after the state court
.
.
t1on
17 Upon remova l, the union moved to dissolve the m1unc
injunct ion .
no juris
and dismiss the action, alleging that the district court had
ia Act.
aGuard
Norris-L
the
of
diction to issue the injunct ion by reason
founded
was
nt
complai
The employer moved to remand arguing that the
18 The district
solely upon breach of a contract arising under state law.
court dissolved the injunction , refused to dismiss, and denied the motion
to remand. It held that its original jurisdictio n was not impaired for the

purposes of awarding other relief merely because a prohibited labor
19
The Court of Appeals affirmed ,
injun ction was among the remedies sought.
15
20 U.S.C. sec. 144l(b) (1964).
16
376 F. 2d

337 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967).

17 Althoug h some states have anti-injunction statutes modeled after the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Tennessee has no such legislative prohibition.
See
Aaron, Labor-Injunctions in the State Courts Part I, 50 Va. L. Rev. 951,
953 n. 7
(1964).
18

Avco's theory that its claim arose under state law, independent of sec.
301, had been accepted by the Third Circuit in American Dredging v. Local
25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F .2d 837 (3d Cir . 1964), cert. denied, 38 0 U. S .
935 (1965).
Removal was held unavailable and the district court's order
denying the employer's motion to remand was reversed. In the instant
case, the Sixth Circuit met A vco's relianc e upon American Dredging by
refusing to follow its "basic premise":
"State law does not exist as an
independe nt source of private rights to enforce collective bargaining con
tracts. "
376 F .2d at 34 0. This rejection of Avco's theory appears correct.
An employer's failure to m ention sec. 301 in his complaint s hould not
alter the fact that the action arises under federal law. Any contention
that the rights asserted are state rights contravenes existing f ederal sub
stantive pre-emption in actions based upon breach of a collective bargain
ing agreeme nt. See note 9 supra. This Comment, therefor e, confines
itself to the second prerequisite--whethe r the district court possesses
original jurisdiction of an action seeking injunctive
relief.
19

In addition to the injunction, Avco had s ought "genera
l r e l ief."
F.2d
at 339.
227

376

holding that Section

4

of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not deprive a

federa l court of original jurisdiction within the meaning of the Removal
Act.

The S ixth Circuit reasoned that "jurisdiction" does not have the

same me aning in Sectio n

4

as it has i n both the Removal Act and Section

301. In upport of its conclusion the court relief upon Professor Chaffee' s
2
The c ourt noted:
"The
analysis
of "jurisdiction" as used in Section 4.

B

loss of the power to grant certain equita b l e remedies does not mean Federal
Zl
Courts ha ve lost jurisdiction over the su bject matter or parties. ,,
Narrowl y read, Sinclair demands only that the district court dismiss,
that count requesting injunctive relief.

for lack of jurisdiction,

Arguably,

the district court retains the power to adjudicate the substance of the
litigation

and award other appropriate relief.

The language of Section

4

speaks n ot of jurisdiction in the sense of power to take c ognizance of
a suit;

rather,

award a
Section

the prohibition is addressed to the court's autho rity to

specific form o f relief--jurisdiction to issue an injunction.
22
7 of the same Act
enables a f ederal court to issue an injunction

after finding that certain compelling circumstances exist.
to jurisdiction in Section

employer's action,

the

4

If the referenc e

i s read as a lack of power t o entertain an

exception of Section

7

seems justifiable only if

the powe r to entertain the action attaches after the hearing of testimony,
cro ss-examin ation , and a finding of specific facts.
Since "jurisdiction,
in the true sense, either attaches at the beginning of a c ase or not at
all, "2 3 the v iew that the proscription of Section 4 embraces the pew er
to entertain the suit w ould appear unacceptable.
An interpretation of Sinclair's unelaborated reference to jurisdiction

necessitates determining whether the right asserted is coextensive with

20

Z.

Chafee, sup ra note 14, at 368.
In commenting upon United States
"(T)he
United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 25 8 (1947), C hafee noteq:
Jus tic e s took it for granted that 'no court shall have jurisdiction . . . '
me ant 'no court shall have power . . . ' yet clearly the District Judge
ha d jurisdiction over the p arties, and
o ver the subject matter.
The District Court did have the power to decide labor disputes, and it
could a t least award damages for acts which
were not to be en
join ed.
(T)he Act says , in effect, 'no court shall have equity jurisdic
v

·

•

•

•

•

tion .

•

.

'

21 376 F. 2d

and lack of equity jurisdiction .
at

22 9 u .S. C .
2
23
z.

341.

sec.

107 (1964 ) .

Chafee, sup ra note

14,

at 371.

228

•

.

.

. is not lack of power."

the relief requested.
junctive relief,

Were there but one count,

the contention that Section

4

a count requ e sting in

deprives the court of an

authority to entertain the action is more appealing.
court can entertain the action and then rule that,

merit,

To arg u e that the

although the case has

the court is without judicial pow er to award the requested relief
1124 T
he contention that

is "to give sanction to an exercise in futil ity.

removal would prove futile p r esupposes that breach of the bargaining
agreement produces separate causes of action,
the relief requested.

each coterminous with

A prayer for injunctive relief alone w ou ld thereby

pre sent a separate and independent claim,

necessitating an equally

independent determination of jurisdictional requirements.
This p osition, however,

is subject to criticism.

First,

it would

seem that the breach produces but one wrong and is more rationally
viewed as g iving rise to a

"single cause of action for which any number
1125
Fu rther, an action seeking
different
rem
edies
(are)
available.
of
26
27
damages
or an order compelling arbitration,
unaccompani ed by a
could encounte r no objection to removal.

demand for injunctive relief,

Nor should the fact that the complaint is c a st seeking only injunctive
relief impair the district court's ability to deal with the litigation, parti
cularly since the court is empowered to award other forms of relief,
Moreover, considering the
whether or not demanded in the complaint. 28

24

American Dredging v.

(3d C i r.

1 964), cert.

deni ed,

Cooke Terminals, Ltd.

251 CD. Hawali

b rought

'

L oc a l 25,
v.

338

O:ierating Eng' rs,

380 U.S. 935

(1965).

Accord,

Local 137, Longshoremen,

1953), noting

F. 2d

110 F.

83 7, 842

Castle &

Supp. 247,

"the absurdity of a case which

'may be

in a federal District Court in which there is no power to give

the relief demanded . .

.

.

"

25

Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735,

Machinists ,

376 F. 2d

3 41 (6th

3 3 7,

Language i n A merican
_Dredging supports the position, 338 F. 2d at 849.
However, the ultimate
ratio decidendi of American Dredging was that the demand for injuncti ve
Cir.

1967),

cert. granted,

88

S. Ct. 103

(1967).

rellef presented a 3eparate and independent claim.

26

See note

12 supra.

Shadd an a l legedl y aggrieved union stri k e in violation
o f a no-strike
disregarding an e xisting procedure calling for arbitrat ion of the
dispute. the district court h as Juris
di ction to issue an order compe lling
.
'Hb1tration of the dispute.
See Sinclair Ref
Co
v Atkinso n
37 0 U S
195, 214 0 96 2 )

27

provision•

·

.

·

•

-

28

•

•

I

•

red. R. Civ . P. 54(c).
But cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (the rules shall
not be construed to extend the court's Jurisdiction).
229

'

request f o r relief as de term inative wou l d contravene the v iew that "the
prayer

for relief is n o t part of the cause of action and shou ld not be

conside r e d i n determining whether such cause of action i s 'separate and
112 9
independent'.
Re fined argument w ou l d appear to dictate that removal is appropriate.

However,

3

with co nsiderable assurance it can be predicte d t hat legal

refinement w ill no t con t rol the disposition of the removal issue in the
Supreme Court.
The approach of the Third Circuit in Amer ican Dredging
31
v. Local 2 5, O perating Eng'rs
is instructive.
The court read Sinclair's
reference to jurisdiction as embracing subject matter jurisdiction and
denied removal.
32

oth er grounds,

Alt hough American Dredging is subject to criticism on

the court ennunciated what is likel y to b e the ratio

decidendi of the removal issue--a consideration of the consequences of
allowing r emoval.

The court noted t hat removal would,

in effect, "sound

the death-knell" of the state court's jurisdict ion over t he action, depriving th e e mployer of a p ermanent injunction available under state law; it

would also make the congressional purpos e underlying Section 301, a
section designed to supplement rather than to displace existing state
court jurisdiction, a "co-victim" with the employer. 33

At first glance the view of the dissenting justice in American Dredging
appears star tling:

"I think that the question of removability affects no
. ,,34 However, the majority• s e laboration

substantive issue here.

•

•

of consequences presupposes an existing disparity between the avail
abilit y o f injunctive rel ief in state and f ederal courts.

read,

Were Sinclair

however, as precluding the issuance of injunctive. r elief in state

courts ,

r emoval would not deprive the employer of an injunction, and no

serious consequences woul d result.
In the first instance t he

The d issent adopts this rationale.

"transcending question" is not the issue of

29
A merican Dredging v. Local 25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F. 2d
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).

837, 849

30
See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Col lective Bargaining Ag reements:
Some Una nswered Questions, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 102 7, 1046-51 (1963).
(Herein a f ter cited as Aar on ).
31
338 F .2d

837 (3d Cir.

1964), cert.

32
8
�
n o te 18 supra.
33
338 F. 2d
34
Id.

at

858

at 843-48.
(dissentin g opinion).
230

denied,

380 U.S.

935

(1965).

O

remova 1.

Rather, the import of

Sinclair's s Hence reappe ars.

15

Sinclair m akes no reference to sta
confines its holding to federal courts.

�

�

courts--ind ed, i explici tly
.
However, m giving effect to

the substant ive independence of Section 301,
unifonn doctrines of federal labor law are to

the Court has held that
actions b ased upon

g overn

3
Although sta te c ourts
breach of a collective bargaining agreement.
retain jurisdiction in Section 301 cases, they must apply federal law;
and, presumably, the expressed federal interest in uniformity would pre
37

If states
clude the state court's resort to incompatible state law.
reach of con
b
in
strikes
against
remedies
injunctive
pply
a
to
remain free
n for hard
i
s
i
law
federal
of
y
od
b
uniform
a
of
tract, " e development
times. "

3ij

The reference is to forum shopping.

Suits for v i olation of a

no-strike cl ause would be brou ght in state courts, conferring upon state
courts, in the first instance, the responsibility of fashioning a uniform
body of f ederal substantive law.

As many state courts "have not proven

themsel ves hospitable to, o r even aware of, national labor p olic y, " the
Supreme Court would "bear the burden of fashi oning and enforcing this
segment of federal law, unaided by the instructive opinions of the lower

federal courts. .. 39

The forum shopping itself would continue beyond an

initial preference for state courts, turning upon which states ha ve anti

40

Given the expressed
inJunctlon statutes and how they construe them.
in terest in uniformity, and a s su m ing the continuing validity o f S inclair,
the view that Sincla
should be read to preclude state court injunctive
relief is compelling. l

�

35

370 U.S.

36

Local

at 214.

1 74 , Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,

369 U. S.

95 (1962).

37

See Avco Corp· v. Aero L odge 735, Machinists,
376 F.2d 337, 343
6
( th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 10
3 (1967) (dictum); a ccord.
American Dredging v. Local 2 5 , Operating
Eng'rs, 338 F.2d
837, 857
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denie d , 380 U.S. 935
(1965) (dissenting opi nion).
38

Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,

39

370 U.S. 195, 2 36 (dissentin g opinion).

Summers, Labor Law Decis ions of
Supreme Court, 1961 Term, ABA Sec
.
tlon
of La't>or Relations 51, 63 (1962
), cited in A:uon, at 1034.

40

l,

Compare Shaw Elec . Co. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Elec t rical Workers

208A.2d 769 (1965), � Tidewater
Expres s Lines v. Freigh
Union, 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d
685 (1963).

41

;

See Aaron,

supra �ote 30,

at 1135.

231

418 Pa.
Drivers

Such a view is n o t without supporting argumert .
to be enjoined under

the Norris-LaGuardia Act .

•

•

"(T)he right not
is a part of the

feder a l right--a part

a n d p arcel of the rights which may be exercised
1142
As the injunctive remedy has
with reference to bargaining agreements.
a very substantial impact upon the intere sts of the parties,

totally different from a lternative fonns of relie
relief should be regarded as a separate right.

to provide injunctions,

43

a n impact

an award of injunctiv e

Were state courts free

the substantive rights of the parties would differ

in the two available forums--forums supposedly applying u niform law.

Whether the Court will extend Sinclair to include state as well a s

federal forums i s questionable.
importa:1t,

the argument

t oo readily repudiated.
and

'federal law'

close

Although the interest i n uniformity is

which seeks to deny state injunctive relief is
"Of course Norris-LaGuardia is 'federal law,'

con trols.

But to settle t he question so simple comes
44
The Norris-LaGuardia Act by its own

to adjudicat i on b y pun. 11

terms is confined to federal courts, a nd

any search for a

fav oring the proscription of state injunctive relief proves

national policy
abortive.

A

rule that would foreclos e s tate injuncti v e remedies would give "altogether

t oo ironic a twist" to legislative intent,
position

fore,

than he was

l ea ving an employer in a worse

in be fore the enactment of Secti on

301. 45

There

i t w ould appear that Sinclair, rather than ennunciating any federal
law applicable in Sec tion 301 suits, m erely reaffirms the lack of power
of f ed e ra l courts alone t o award injunctive religf.
A contrary interpreta
4
tion would violate the Lincoln Mills directive
that n at ional la bor

�ol l cie s are to guide the judiciary' s fashioning of federal labor law.

the paramount policy is an interest in the eff ective e nf orcement
of collective bargaining agreements, states should remain free to award
1npinc ti ve relief .

Since

Adopting the conclusion that Sinclair should not be

read to embrace

42M cCarrol l v. Los Ang eles County District of Ca r pe n te r s , 49 Cal. 2d
w, P. Zd 322, 338 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (qissenting

43

44

See Aa ron , supra note

45. 73-4,
opinion).

30, at 1035.

Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor
Contracts:
Beyond Norris-LaGuardia, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 758 (1966).

45

49 Cal. 2d
Mccarroll v. Los Ang eles County District of Carpe nters
5
932 (1958).
U.S.
5
3
denied,
rt
e
c
(1957)
332
45, 63-4, 315 P.2d 322,
,

.

46

353

U.S.

448, 456 (1957).

232

state courts,
issue?

what then is the appropriate disposition of the removal

Were the Court to affirm Avco, it would, in effect,

state equitable relief; and,

the availabi lity of state injunctive relief,
Admittedly,

emasculate

without a concurrent willingness to foreclose
the

Court is unlikely to affirm.

a denial of removal would involve something less than complete

intellectual honesty, since the conditions of removal appear satisfied
and there exists no provision in the Removal Act necessitating an examin
ation of the consequences of permitting removal.
interest of effective enforcement of bargaining
should reverse Avco and deny removal.

Nevertheless,

agreements,

in the

the Court

Any search for a more palatable

disposition is likely to prove frustrating.
That Sinclair necessitates sacrificing an interest in uniformity is
Sinclair's rationale that
The case should be overruled.
unfortunate.
Congress, rather than the Court, should resolve any conflict between
Section 4 a n d the interest in effective enforcement of labor contracts
preserves the status quo in a p o lit ically sensitive area unlikely to yield
cl successfu l legislative response.
MorED ver, such an approach seems
inconsistent with the creative role the Court readily accepted
Mills.

in Lincoln

Because the issue was politically sensitive, the Court demanded

more than the cloudy and confusing record that accompanied Section 301' s
enactment.

However, in an area filled with po!itical sensitivities,

leg

lslative ambiguity is often deliberate, in the hope that the judiciary will
ilccom modate apparently conflicting statutes and shape a rule that will

best effectuate the purposes of each.

The Court, nevertheless,

arguments in support of an acco mmodation.

In his dissent,

Brennan underscored the m ajority's principal failure:
pause long before committing

Mr.

repudiated
Justice

"(E)mploy e rs will

themselves to obligations enforceable against

them but not a gainst their un ions .

..

47

Section 301 acknowledged the

importance of assuring an employer's willingness to defer to the arbitral
process.

Sinclair serves onl y to disrupt that willingness.

To the extent that the Court is unwilling t o repudiate Sin c lair',

it

should caref ully conf ine the case to the injunctive power of a district
court in a suit brooght to enjoin a strike in breach of a no-strike pro
vislon

·

An i njunction should issue, however,

pursuant to an arbitrator's

clward whi ch itself contains an order forbidding the strike.
Should an allegedly aggrieved union strike

strike provision,

of the dlspute

disregarding an existing procedure calling for arbitration

an employer has the right to obtain a district court order

'.
compelling arbitration of the dispute.

47

Sinclair Ref.

opinion).

in violation of a no
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If the arbitrator sustains the
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227 (1962) (dissen ting

,thon,

employer's p os i
cease striking.

his award might include an order that the u nion

District court enforcemen t o f the award,

however,

would ne cessarily involve enjoining a strike--having come full

the proscrip tions of Section 4
However,

approach.

pursuant to
formulation
s elf - he l p,

reappear,

arguments supporting the issuance of an injunction

an arbitrator's award are persuasive.
of

circle,

strengthened by Sinclair's literal
After the careful

a procedure for settling disputes without resort

a strike in disregard of that proce
s tri k e clause should not lightly be condoned.

'!�re

to economic

and in breach of a

no

To provid e an employer with an order compelling his union to arbi
trate without

the court also expressing a willingness to enforce the

award would

provide the employer with but an empty right.

henring on

After a full

the merits by one voluntarily chosen by the parties,

were the

u.rbitrator to conclude that the only effective remedy is an award for
bidding the

strike,

a refusal to enforce the award would contravene the

doctrine tha t the district court is to respect the remedy deemed appropriate

by the a rbit rator so long as the ordered remedy appears within the scope
�
'Jf hi s authority. ::>O If it is assumed that, after bargaining over the
scope

of an arbitrator's authority,

both union and managemen t a greed

thM. such authority would include a power to enjoin strikes or lockouts,

lt maxes little sense for a court to refuse to enforce the award .

•l uthority of

the arbitrator derives solely from the consent

As the

of the parties,

hls authority is not subject to the same abuse as that which prompted
the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
eliminate

Section 4 was design e d to

u nrestrained judicia1 condemnation of

strikes.

Here,

however,

the court w ould merely be enforcing the order of an arbitrator upon whom

the parties expressly conferred the power to enjoin a strike.
the cour t involve itself with a determinat ion of

Nor need

the unlawfulness of the

strike , f or tha � determination has already been made after a full hearing

0!1

the merits in an extrajudicial forum.

In Ruppert v. Egelhofer, S 1 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the power of an arbitrator to enjoin a strike. Although the
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agreement did

not expressly confer injunctive power upon the arbitrator

the court inferred the existence of such power wi thin his aut hority,
ing that only an injunction would effectuate the parties' inten t .

In

reason

response to the union's content i on that New York's anti-injunction statute
of the award e n joining a

(Section 876-a) precluded specific enforcement

strike, the court stated:

"Section 876-a and article 84 (arbitration)

�lie

each represents a separate %
monize those two policies.
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policy and by affinning here we har-

Admittedly,

.

.

Ruppert antedates Sinclair, and

it must be noted that the New York Court of Appeals' approach , harmonizing
conflicting policies, squarely conflicts w ith the r ationale of Sinclair-
namely, existing conflicts in legislative pronouncements are to be resolved
by Congress rather than by the courts.

Nevertheless, there is room for

In the interest of protecting an employer's willingness to

distinction.

defer to arbitratiorg injunctive relief should be available pursuant to an
3
A contrary result would only compound t h e error
arbitrator's award.

of Sinclair,

endangering the very scheme the Court has so carefully pro

tected--the substitution of the arbitral process
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